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Abstract
Bitcoin has become increasingly important in recent years. The exchange rate raised from $14 in January 2013 up to $240 in April
2013 and even $900 in early 2014. In this paper, we present novel insights about Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer (P2P) network with a
special focus on its distribution among distinct autonomous systems. We traversed Bitcoin’s P2P network in a protocol-compliant
manner and collected information about the network size, the number of clients, and the network distribution among autonomous
systems. Our ﬁndings lead to conclusions about the resilience of the Bitcoin ecosystem, the unambiguousness of the blockchain in
use, and the propagation and veriﬁcation of transaction blocks.
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1. Motivation
Bitcoin’s popularity is increasing tremendously. Although completely virtual cash, there is a growing number of
coﬀee shops and bars that accept Bitcoin as payment – at the time of writing in early 2014. In scientiﬁc literature,
Bitcoin has been analyzed extensively in the past few years. There are extensions of the protocol like Zerocoin1,
privacy evaluations2 and analyses regarding environmental3 or legal aspects4, for example. Our work is concerned
with user’s anonymity in the Bitcoin network and the robustness of the network itself. This paper is – to the best of
our knowledge – the ﬁrst that gives concrete numbers on size, structure and distribution of Bitcoin’s core P2P network
while highlighting aspects regarding autonomous systems (AS) at the same time. This is directly connected to an
individual’s anonymity since Bitcoin utilizes k-anonymity heavily. We are able to show that it is not only “one out
of all Bitcoin peers” as typically assumed, but also “one out of the Bitcoin peers in a particular AS” which reduces
the number of potentially concealing peers and increases privacy risks. This ﬁnding leads us to a statement about
Bitcoin’s robustness directly. The whole idea behind Bitcoin relies on fast information propagation throughout the
network to prevent so-called “blockchain-forks”. A recent attack-model to enforce such forks (as proposed by Decker
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and Wattenhofer5) is based on assumptions about the network’s size and topology. Our ﬁndings support this model
and propose further investigations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy explains the key aspects of Bitcoin necessary
in the course of this paper and additionally sums up related work. Section 3 describes our methodology when analyz-
ing Bitcoin’s P2P network. In Section 4 we present and discuss our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes our work and
gives some hints for future research.
2. Related Work
This section brieﬂy demonstrates the functionality of Bitcoin and related work in the area of Bitcoin measurement.
2.1. Functionality of Bitcoin
Basically, Bitcoin is a completely decentralized electronic currency system based on a peer-to-peer network. Its
history starts in November 2008, as Satoshi Nakomoto (probably a pseudonym) releases the article ”Bitcoin: A peer-
to-peer electronic cash system”6. Bitcoin is based on digital signatures in order to prove the possession of bitcoins
(the currency) as well as on a publicly visible history of transactions together with cryptographic proof-of-works.
The remarkable property with Bitcoin is the absence of a central authority or issuer of currency. Instead, new
bitcoins are issued constantly at a speciﬁc rate through so-called “mining”. Also, the execution of transactions is
monitored and reviewed by the P2P network. Therefore, the network’s participants work towards a collective con-
sensus regarding the transaction’s validity and append it to the public history of already conﬁrmed transactions (the
so-called “blockchain”). Both, extending the blockchain and forming a consensus over valid transactions is achieved
via a proof-of-work system7,8. Participants in Bitcoin’s P2P network collect transactions into a block of data and per-
form hashing of this block modiﬁed with a nonce until a speciﬁcally structured key has been found. If the sought-after
nonce is found, the P2P network veriﬁes the result and ﬁnally each client appends the transactions to its own copy of
the blockchain. Thus, the transaction has irreversibly taken place and, from now on, the longest blockchain represents
the proof of happened events in a precise sequence.
The process of ﬁnding the proper nonce is Bitcoin’s main security mechanism because it is assumed to be compu-
tationally expensive. In order to motivate the participants to join the veriﬁcation and appending of transactions, there
are two mechanisms: transactions fees and freshly “minted” bitcoins. Each correctly hashed block generates bitcoins
owned by the miner.
2.2. Bitcoin Measurement
There are several studies concerning Bitcoin that make use of its transaction history. Ron and Shamir9 proposed
extensive analysis of user’s behavior, the ﬂow of coins, user’s balances and selected large transactions, for example.
Reid and Harrigan2 provided the ﬁrst comprehensive work regarding anonymity in Bitcoin. They thought of an
attacker who, in order to de-anonymize Bitcoin’s users, creates a 1-to-n-mapping between a user and the corresponding
public keys. They performed a complete passive analysis as they constructed a transaction graph out of the publicly
available transaction history. Using this transaction graph they created a user network via so-called linking and added
further external information in order to analyze some bitcoin thieveries. In this work we want to discuss the possibility
of “linking” transactions on an AS-level. We show that peers are not equally distributed over the underlying P2P
network and thus exhibit the possibility of linking using AS-level information.
Ober et al. 10 showed that dynamic eﬀects inﬂuence the anonymity with Bitcoin in both ways, positive and negative.
We pick up their idea of a volatile privacy when highlighting the size and distribution of Bitcoin’s P2P network: Ober
et al. stated that anonymity in communication systems can be measured by a notion similar to k-anonymity11. We
claim that this is too optimistic: A particular Bitcoin user is not “one out of all peers” but, for example, “one out of
the peers inside his autonomous system”.
At the Black Hat USA 2011 Conference, Dan Kaminsky presented an analysis of the Bitcoin system he per-
formed12. He investigated, in particular, possible identity ﬂaws at the TCP/IP layer. The main idea is to open con-
nections to preferably all peers in Bitcoin’s P2P network at once resulting in mapping IP addresses to transactions.
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Fig. 1. Left-hand: Summary of the measure’s statistics on 27.01.2014. Right-hand: Cumulated number of connection attempts (solid line) and
successful connections (dotted line) to unique Bitcoin peers.
There is the assumption that the ﬁrst peer that broadcasts a transaction is the originator. After mapping a peer’s IP
address to a transaction, two transactions can possibly be linked if they happen in quick succession. We take this idea
a step further and claim that two transactions that are further apart in time can possibly be linked when taking more
information, e.g. on an AS-level, into account.
3. Methodology
To gather information about Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network, we crawled the network connecting to clients and
collecting their knowledge of each other. Since we based our implementation on an API13 that is publicly available,
our tool appeared as a regular client to others. This enabled us to communicate with Bitcoin clients in a protocol-
compliant manner. We requested a list of other peer’s IP addresses (referred to as peerlist) from each client we
contacted to. By repeating this enquiry on every new entry on the growing set of known peers, we traversed through
Bitcoin’s P2P network recursively. Actually, this is a well-known approach in current research concerned with P2P
networks or Botnets14,15.
However, analyzing such P2P networks (to enumerate clients, for example) by traversing through the network
often provides unsatisfying results as Rossow et al. recently pointed out16. A lot of clients live behind a NAT or
proxy making it impossible to contact them actively. Therefore, Rossow et al. discriminate between three types of
clients: routable peers that can be contacted via an ingress connection, non-routable peers that can establish outgoing
connections only because of an intermediate NAT or proxy, and unreachable peers that cannot be contacted by any
other peer but are still known to one or more other peers. In the following, we will use this deﬁnition and concentrate
on routable peers.
This assumption only covers a small fraction of Bitcoin clients, of course. But, we are not aimed at counting all
existing clients. In fact, we tried to get an insight on how well Bitcoin’s P2P network is interconnected under an
AS-level perspective. Since publicly routable peers are the only ones contacted by non-routable peers, they constitute
Bitcoin’s backbone for information propagation such as forming a consensus over new transactions or broadcasting
other known peers.
We traversed the network by collecting IP addresses from each peer and connecting to each of the returned ad-
dresses recursively. Of course, the returned peerlist also contained non-routable or non-reachable addresses resulting
in a high number of unsuccessful connection attempts. Our framework is parameterizable to easily ﬁne-tune its ﬂow
control, its maximum size of queue of clients to contact, or its duration of a connection to one single client. Each
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Fig. 2. Distribution of clients among autonomous systems (AS).
client’s address together with its response of known peers was saved into a database for later analysis. For determining
each client’s autonomous system and its country we used Maxmind’s free Geo API 1 and corresponding databases.
4. Results and Discussion
We performed several measurements that took diﬀering time durations to complete. This is mainly caused by our
framework’s ﬂow control parameters: We deﬁned 60 seconds as the timeout for pending peers and 15 seconds as
the duration a successful connection is maintained. The latter is a suﬃcient time for receiving a peerlist from the
connected peer. All measurements were initiated by contacting a random Bitcoin peer.
The following subsections highlight some key results of a representative measure we started on 27.01.2014 on a
server in AS6724 (Germany). That run took about 16 hours. We grouped our ﬁndings with regard to a) Bitcoin peers,
b) autonomous systems and c) peerlists. The measure’s statistics are summarized in Figure 1.
4.1. Bitcoin Peers
Our framework described in Section 3 tried to connect to as many peers as possible. The solid line in Figure 1
(logarithmic scale) shows the number of unique connection attempts over time. Since we tried to connect to every
unique IP address found while traversing the number contains non-routable, oﬄine as well as routable addresses
circulating inside the P2P network. The dotted line in Figure 1 shows actual successful connections to unique Bitcoin
peers. We were able to connect to 10,549 unique peers within 16 hours. Note that we have a certain error, since there is
the possibility that we count a peer twice (e.g., a regular disconnect caused by the peer’s ISP). Since clients connecting
to Bitcoin’s P2P network ﬁrst perform outgoing connection attempts to one or more publicly available (routable) peers,
the connected peers mentioned above could be seen as Bitcoin’s backbone. The proportion of successful connection
attempts is around 1.5%. This means, that about 98.5% of the IP addresses broadcasted in Bitcoin’s P2P network
either belong to non-routable or unreachable peers.
4.2. Autonomous Systems
IP addresses can easily be grouped, for example, by means of geographic regions or autonomous systems, whereat
the latter has got a higher resolution.
1 http://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/legacy/geolite/
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Fig. 3. Analysis of returned peerlists.
The two graphs on the left-hand side of Figure 2 show the cumulative distribution of routable clients among
autonomous systems. The leftmost graph concentrates on the most populated AS clearly showing that over 30% of
the peers we connected to reside in just ten AS. The graph also shows that half of the routable peers are distributed over
less than 40 AS. Finally, the rightmost graph in Figure 2 depicts the complete quantity of the AS involved together
with their corresponding number of online peers contained (logarithmic scale). Altogether, we were able to count
1,705 diﬀerent AS. Note the remarkable long tail. In fact, in 95% of the AS involved our framework was just able to
connect to 20 peers or less. The tail’s end shows that there are 929 autonomous systems that contained just a single
peer.
These numbers have an inpact on at least the vitality and resilience of Bitcoin’s ecosystem. As mentioned before,
the publicly available Bitcoin peers are some kind of Bitcoin’s backbone since new peers wanting to connect to the
P2P network perform a connection attempt to one of those peers. Thus, an outage or failure of a particular autonomous
system can possibly have an impact on the reachability of Bitcoin’s P2P network.
Also, as mentioned above, “linking” transactions is a serious threat to users’ anonymity and privacy and is theo-
retically2 12 and practically17 possible. We take on this idea, but loose Dan Kaminsky’s conditions from concrete IP
addresses12 to autonomous systems. Our ﬁndings clearly show that there are a lot of AS containing only one routable
peer and, hence, those peers can be seen as exclusive within their particular AS. We now assume that each of these
peers is the only one in the corresponding AS that runs a Bitcoin client. Thus, transactions that are further apart in
time and even are broadcasted from diﬀerent IP addresses can be linked nevertheless – as long as they emerge from
an autonomous system containing probably just a single client. Furthermore, considering k-anonymity as a measure
for anonymity and holding the number of unique peers inside a particular AS as variable k, a peer’s anonymity within
one of the 929 autonomous systems mentioned above possibly degrades to ”1-out-of-1”.
4.3. Peerlists
A client that joins Bitcoin’s P2P network connects to a random peer via a bootstrap mechanism and afterwards
requests a peerlist from its ﬁrst peer. The reference implementation of a Bitcoin client answers with a peerlist con-
taining at most 2, 500 IP addresses. This list does not reveal the peer’s internal order and contains both routable and
non-routable addresses as well as non-reachable ones.
We compared all collected peerlists and focussed on their overlapping. The left-hand histogram in Figure 3 depicts
a histogram of the sizes of the intersection of all peerlist pairs reported. It is obvious that the average intersection of
two random peerlists is below 10%. This result is quite positive for Bitcoin’s vitality and resilience, since a new peer
gets to many IP addresses of possible peers very quickly. Besides that, a small intersection of peerlists is an indication
of a well meshed P2P network since the knowledge of each other is a precondition for a future successful connection.
Another aspect we want to highlight is the distribution of the addresses contained in the peerlists regarding diﬀer-
ent autonomous systems. The right-hand histogram of Figure 3 depicts the average number of distinct autonomous
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systems a peerlist’s addresses reside in. One can clearly see that only a small fraction of peers knows about peers in
other autonomous systems.
Both histograms together reveal an interesting insight. It appears as if an average peer knows many diﬀerent peers,
indeed. But, most of those peers reside in the same autonomous system. This leaves Bitcoin’s vitality, resilience
and security ﬂawed. Apparently, blockchain forks as proposed by Decker and Wattenhofer5 and double-spendings
as proposed by Karame et al. 18 can be considered a serious threat if an attacker takes information about autonomous
systems into account.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced a framework that traverses Bitcoin’s P2P network and generates statistics regarding its size and
distribution among autonomous systems. We were able to show that there are more than 10,500 publicly available
peers that constitute the network’s core. These peers are distributed over more than 1,700 diﬀerent AS. Although
this appears as a balanced distribution, we found that only 10 AS contained more than 30% of all routable peers.
Additionally, there were over 900 autonomous systems that contained just a single peer. Furthermore, an average
peerlist contains addresses that mostly reside in the peer’s own AS. Taking this information into account we claim that
transaction linking could be possible.
As a next step one should consider deploying a (passive) sensor network into the Bitcoin P2P network. This would
enable communication with non-routable peers and could gain additional insight.
Another interesting question is the distribution of mining pools on an AS level. Bitcoins are considered secure or
stable as long as one attacker does not concentrate more than 50% of the computing power since mining can be seen
as a competition based on distributed computing power. With that in mind, could the outage of a single AS possibly
shift the distribution of power signiﬁcantly?
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